play a role in "special" cases requiring "specialized patterns of motor coordination like skilled typewriting" (Goldenberg, 2013, p. 125) . (This arbitrary distinction between ordinary and special cases of action bears discussion in its own right given that even "simple" tool-use is a learned motor skill, toodsee e.g., Kahrs, Jung, and Lockman (2013) e but lack of space precludes that discussion here).
The second questionable premise is that production and recognition of tool-use pantomime relies upon information entirely independent from that required for actual tool-use, because "the range of actions that we know and understand is much larger than the range of actions our motor system can execute" (Goldenberg, 2013, p. 183) . Specifically, pantomime requires "selection and combination of distinctive features extracted from a mental image of tool use" based on "some knowledge about the action or, respectively, some memory of having witnessed this action before" (Goldenberg, 2013, p. 183) . Again, the format of these "mental images" is not specified, but one can infer that they are meant to be visual and/or verbal (in any event, not motor). With respect to recognition, Goldenberg views as "awkward" the idea that a supplementary mechanism would be needed for understanding actions that are not in our motor repertoire (Goldenberg, 2013, p. 183) .
In response to these claims, I'll briefly review some recent evidence about how the brain organizes semantic information (including stored action knowledge). The data I review are consistent with the basic premises that: 1) knowledge representations are distributed and graded, exhibiting visual, motor, auditory, and/or tactile properties as a function of mode(s) of acquisition, current network states, task demands, and location in the brain (e.g., Plaut, 2002) , and 2) brain regions involved in the representation of knowledge are the same regions that were involved in acquiring the information (e.g., Allport, 1985 
